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Abstract
Democratic citizens often lack rudimentary knowledge about their political institutions,
elected leaders, and the policies their leaders choose. Epistemic democrats contend democ-
racies produce reasonable decisions despite the ignorance of the typical voter; against them,
epistocrats claim that non-democratic regimes in which more knowledgeable citizens are put
in charge would produce better decisions. We explain the shortcomings with the arguments
on both sides. Epistocrats may be right that all else being equal, a more competent electorate
would produce better decisions, and epistemic democrats may be right that all else being equal,
a more diverse and inclusive electorate would produce better decisions. But all else is not equal,
and neither camp provides arguments for believing that their favorite partial effect of restrict-
ing the franchise will prevail over countervailing effects. We explain why the total effect of
such restrictions is theoretically indeterminate, and why more empirical evidence is needed.
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Most democratic citizens appear to be ignorant of crucial facts about the political systems in which
they participate, the parties and candidates they vote for, and the policies their leaders enact. They
lack the basic knowledge that one would need to form reliable judgments about the consequences
of those policies. Some scholars trace democracy’s ills to these well-known facts about “voter
incompetence” (e.g., Achen and Bartels, 2016; Caplan, 2007; Schumpeter, 1942; Somin, 2013).
Some press further — it has long been argued that ignorance and incompetence are sufficient rea-
sons to exclude ordinary citizens from political decision-making (e.g., Plato, 1992, book VI), or
at least to reduce their influence on political decisions (e.g., Mill, 1861, chap. 8). According to
these “epistocrats”, a non-democratic regime in which competent citizens have a monopoly on, or
at least a greater share of, decision-making power would produce better decisions than a democ-
racy that enfranchises everyone, competent and incompetent alike (for recent arguments, see Bell
2015; Brennan, 2016). So-called “epistemic democrats”, drawing inspiration from ideas such as
the “wisdom of the crowds” (Waldron, 1995, who traces this idea to Aristotle; Surowiecki, 2004)
and the Condorcet jury theorem (Condorcet, 1785), counter that democratic regimes can have a
tendency to produce good decisions even if typical voters are ignorant or irrational (Anderson,
2006; Cohen, 1986; Estlund, 2008; Goodin and Spiekermann, 2018; Grofman and Feld, 1988;
Landemore, 2012; Ober, 2008, 2013).1
We show that recent arguments for and against competence-based franchise restrictions have
taken an incomplete view of their epistemic consequences.2 Start with arguments for restricting
the franchise to competent citizens. Epistocrats overwhelmingly focus on typical voters’ lack of
social scientific knowledge and manifest deficiencies in their reasoning. They have thus limited
their attention to what we might call cognitive competencies. Stated precisely, then, epistocrats
1See Schwartzberg (2015) for a review of the literature on epistemic democracy.
2To avoid tedious repetition, “consequences,” “benefits,” and “costs” refer to epistemic conse-
quences, epistemic benefits, and epistemic costs, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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conjecture that excluding cognitively incompetent citizens from the electorate will enhance group
decision-making all else equal. But all else is not necessarily equal. The ability to acquire and de-
ploy policy-relevant facts is not sufficient for recognizing policy-relevant reasons and giving these
reasons proper weight. Other attributes typically ignored by a focus on “competence” matter too.
These include: life experiences that draw attention to reasons that would go unrecognized by those
who lack similar experiences, the ability to sympathetically identify with another’s plight, a dis-
position to care about others’ welfare, and so on. If cognitive competence is negatively correlated
with these other attributes — we argue for the plausibility of this claim below — then excluding
cognitively incompetent citizens from the electorate entails the exclusion of perspectives and dis-
positions that can improve a polity’s decisions. Epistocrats’ emphasis on cognitive competence is
thus too narrow to determine the full consequences of competence-based restrictions on voting.
Epistemic democrats, for their part, highlight the benefits of including citizens with diverse
perspectives and dispositions (esp. Anderson, 2010; Estlund, 2008; Landemore, 2012).3 But
their focus on mobilizing diversity is similarly too narrow to determine the full consequences
of competence-based restrictions. A diverse and inclusive electorate plausibly improves collective
decision making all else equal. But, again, all else is not necessarily equal. If increasing diversity
in the electorate also decreases the cognitive competence of the electorate, then a full accounting of
the consequences of competence-based restrictions (obversely, of increasing diversity) must attend
to the possibility that the costs of limiting diversity are outweighed by the benefits of reducing the
influence of ignorant and irrational citizens on group decisions.
To put the previous points succinctly, epistemic arguments for and against democracy have
to this point concentrated on partial effects of competence-based franchise restrictions, but what
3Epistemic arguments that appeal to diversity are sometimes contrasted with appeals to the
Condorcet jury theorem (Estlund, 2008, p. 232). However, see Goodin and Spiekermann (2018,
ch. 7).
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matters is their total effect on the quality of decision-making. One partial effect of such restric-
tions will be an electorate that is more knowledgable, by some measure; another partial effect is
an electorate that is less diverse, containing a narrower range of the life experiences, moral dis-
positions, and abilities that can help one identify reasons for and against policies. The total effect
of competence-based franchise restrictions depends on the relative magnitudes of these opposed
partial effects.
We start by presenting empirical evidence that suggests, pace epistocrats, that enfranchising
cognitively incompetent citizens can improve policy decisions. Probing further, we present several
plausible mechanisms that can explain why both historically observed and hypothetical suffrage
expansions can improve policy decisions while nonetheless enfranchising cognitively incompetent
citizens. These mechanisms illuminate the thought that competence-based franchise restrictions
can indirectly undermine the reliability of group decisions by decreasing beneficial epistemic di-
versity. Epistocrats have yet to demonstrate that the indirect costs of disenfranchising incompetent
citizens do not outweigh the direct benefits of these restrictions. Yet this conclusion brings cold
comfort to epistemic democrats. The mechanisms we present suggest an analogous challenge for
epistemic arguments for universal suffrage, namely, that increasing diversity within the electorate
can indirectly undermine the reliability of group decisions by diluting the beneficial influence of
informed and rational judgments in the aggregate. Epistemic democrats, for their part, have yet to
demonstrate that the indirect costs of increasing diversity within the electorate do not outweigh the
direct benefits of eliminating competence-based franchise restrictions.
We conclude by marking the ways in which our comparison of the partial effects of
competence-based franchise restrictions is theoretically indeterminate. The total effect of these
restrictions is ambiguous in theory. We thus have no theoretical grounds for adjudicating among
epistemic arguments for and against competence-based franchise restrictions. Settling this debate
requires much more empirical work on the conditions under which diversity-enhancing initiatives
and competence-enhancing initiatives pull in opposing directions, as well as the relative magni-
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tudes of these countervailing partial effects.
An empirical challenge to epistocracy
The epistocrat’s position relies on two propositions. The first is that we should evaluate forms
of government solely by their tendency to produce good policy decisions. We grant this premise
for the sake of argument (but see Bagg, forthcoming; Christiano, 1996; Kolodny, 2014). The
second key proposition is what we shall call the epistocracy conjecture: a non-democratic form of
government in which competent citizens wield disproportionate, if not exclusive political decision-
making power would produce better decisions than a democracy with universal suffrage. If these
two propositions are true, it follows that we should leave political decisions to competent citizens
and disenfranchise incompetent citizens, or at least reduce their influence on political decisions.
The immediate question, of course, is how we should determine which citizens qualify as
competent and thus can be entitled to participate in political decision processes. As one recent
epistocrat describes it, citizens in a “restricted suffrage epistocracy” would have to “pass a voter
qualification exam” to gain the right to participate in elections.
The exam would screen out citizens who are badly misinformed or ignorant about
the election, or who lack basic social scientific knowledge. The United States, for
example, might use the questions on the ANES [American National Election Study].
Alternatively, the United States might require citizens to pass the citizenship exam, or
score a three or higher on the Advanced Placement economics and political science
exams. (Brennan, 2016, pp. 211, 212)
To “earn [their] license to vote,” citizens would have to establish that they possess certain forms
of political and scientific knowledge, as well as the ability to put that knowledge to proper use
when making voting decisions (as indicated, perhaps, by their ability to “solve a number of logic
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and mathematics puzzles” [ibid., p. 212]).4 In short, epistocrats propose to restrict the suffrage to
citizens who possess certain cognitive competencies.5
It might seem as though we can only speculate about the epistemic consequences of intro-
ducing voter qualification exams because such electoral rules have not been tried, at least not as
epistocrats envision them (Brennan 2016, p. 205). Historically observed examples of franchise
restrictions — those based on gender, race or ethnicity, religion, or property-ownership — are all
different from what is being contemplated here. Even literacy tests, which in theory might proxy
for the kind of competence tests that epistocrats favor, have historically been applied prejudicially,
as means of disenfranchising citizens according to race. Yet this resignation to speculation is too
hasty. As we now show, historically observed restrictions of the franchise offer a conditional test
of the epistocracy conjecture, at least a strong version of it.
Strong epistocracy conjecture: The expected quality of the decisions produced by
an electoral regime is an increasing function of the proportion of the electorate that
would pass a voter qualification exam.
(We explain the sense in which this version is strong and consider a weaker version below.)
Studies of historically observed franchise restrictions provide a test of this strong conjecture
because the removal of such restrictions plausibly decreased the proportion of the electorate that
4Brennan’s emphasis on knowledge acquisition and reasoning ability is in keeping with other
recent democracy skeptics such as Bryan Caplan (2008) and Ilya Somin (2013).
5To focus our discussion, we restrict attention in what follows to an “electoral epistocracy”
whose institutions resemble those of the democratic regime with which it is being compared, but
for its disenfranchisement of citizens who fail a competence test. Our arguments, or analogous
arguments, plausibly apply to alternative models of epistocracy, such as the other models discussed
in Brennan (2016) or the idealized model of Chinese political meritocracy defended in Bell (2015),
but that is an issue for future research.
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would have passed a voter qualification exam of the kind epistocrats favor, even if that was not
their purpose. Imagine that a test with questions analogous to those from the ANES (questions
like “What office does Jeff Sessions currently hold?”) or an AP economics exam (“Which of the
following situations would necessarily lead to an increase in the price of peaches?”) had been given
to all South Africans when apartheid was abolished. It is likely that blacks would have performed
worse than whites, owing to deep social and economic inequalities between the two groups. Thus,
one likely effect of removing the apartheid-era restrictions and enfranchising black South Africans
was to decrease the proportion of the electorate that would have passed a voter qualification exam.
If the strong version of the epistocracy conjecture is true, then the effect should have been to reduce
the expected quality of political decisions. So what happened in this case?
Kroth et al. (2016) find that South Africa’s post-apartheid suffrage expansion (the first general
election with universal suffrage was held in April 1994) improved black South Africans’ access to
electricity. The authors find that, between 1996 and 2001, municipalities with larger populations
of newly enfranchised voters saw greater increases in the percentage of households with access to
electricity. A battery of placebo tests lends credibility to the claim that the correlation represents a
causal effect of the enfranchisement of black citizens. It seems safe to assume that the expansion of
the electrical grid to these municipalities was a beneficial policy outcome. If so, then the expansion
of the franchise, even though it likely decreased the proportion of the electorate who would have
passed a voter qualification exam, resulted in a better policy. Of course, policies affecting access
to electricity are just one narrow policy domain, and one would like to know whether the result
generalizes to other policy domains.
No other studies of the South African case exist to our knowledge,6 but studies of several
6We have restricted our attention to studies that make a credible claim to overcome reasonable
concerns about omitted variable bias, which would apply to a simple comparison of policy out-
comes before and after a change in the electoral rules. In the South African case, for example,
it is likely that the social and political processes that led to the end of apartheid, and the suffrage
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other historical cases show that franchise expansions have had plausibly beneficial effects in other
policy domains. Vernby (2013), for example, studies the effects of the Swedish Voting Rights
Reform of 1975, which gave non-citizen immigrants who had been in the country for at least three
years the right to vote and stand in elections to municipal assemblies. He finds that, following the
reform, municipal spending on education and family and social services increased in municipalities
with larger shares of non-citizens in the electorate, suggesting that their enfranchisement caused
the comparatively greater increase in spending.7 Since the franchise expansion was prompted
by a desire to improve the provision of education and social services to non-citizen immigrants
(Vernby, 2013, p. 17), it seems likely that the enfranchised non-citizen immigrant population,
owing to social and economic inequalities, would likely have scored worse on a voter qualification
exam than the rest of the Swedish electorate, on average. If so, and if one believes that increased
spending on education and family and social services was good policy, then the study is further
evidence against the strong epistocracy conjecture.
Miller (2008) uses variation in the timing of women’s suffrage laws in U.S. states to study the
effects of extending the right to vote to women on child mortality.8 The author finds that women’s
expansion in particular, also had their own effects on policy outcomes, which the naı¨ve comparison
would mistake for the effects of the suffrage expansion.
7The credibility of the estimate is helped by several robustness checks. An especially compelling
placebo test is Vernby’s estimate, using the same research design, of the effect of non-citizen share
of the electorate on municipal investments in waste-handling facilities. Since these investments
are likely to affect citizens and non-citizens in similar way — unlike spending on education and
family and social services, where the different age distributions within the two populations would
naturally result in different preferences — one would not expect enfranchisement to have any effect
if the postulated causal mechanism is at work. The author finds no evidence of an effect on this
outcome.
8Before the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, women had the right to vote in
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suffrage was associated with significant declines in child mortality; the estimates imply that there
were “approximately 20,000 averted child deaths nationwide each year relative to mortality before
suffrage laws were enacted” (p. 1309).9
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 eliminated literacy tests that had been used in Southern states
to disenfranchise blacks. Cascio and Washington (2014) look for evidence that this change in elec-
toral rules shifted the distribution of state funds in favor of counties with larger black population
shares (and thus larger population shares of newly enfranchised voters). They find evidence that
shifts in the distribution of funds toward counties with higher black population shares were larger
in those Southern states that had used literacy tests (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia), compared with those Southern states that lacked
literacy tests (Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas). This suggests that the elimination of the
literacy tests affected the distribution of funds, directing greater shares to blacks. They also present
evidence that these counties saw greater gains in the quality of schools for blacks and in school
enrollment for black teenagers compared with their counterparts in states where no literacy tests
had existed prior to the Voting Rights Act. Their results fit with those from Naidu’s (2012) study
29 of 48 states, mostly in the West (Miller, 2008, p. 1291).
9Kudamatsu’s (2012) study of the effects of democratization — as opposed to the extension
of the franchise within a democracy — on child mortality comes to a similar conclusion. Using
survey data from sub-Saharan Africa, the author estimates this effect with variation in the survival
of babies born to the same mother, before and after democratization, and finds that infant mortality
dropped by an average of 1.2 percentage points as a result of democratization. Given its use
of within-mother variation, the study design is arguably more credible than that in Ross (2006),
which finds no effects of democratization on infant mortality but bases his estimate of the effect on
cross-country variation and may therefore confound the causal effect with the effect of unobserved,
time-varying country-level variables that influence both democratization and infant mortality.
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estimating the effects of Southern blacks’ disenfranchisement, through the voting restrictions im-
plemented in the 1890s, on educational outcomes. He finds that disenfranchisement reduced the
teacher-student ratio in black schools.
In all of these historical cases, the newly included groups were socially disadvan-
taged — victims of racial oppression, women, non-citizen immigrants. It is plausible to assume
that these groups would have performed worse than the average member of the population on a
hypothetical voter qualification exam of the kind epistocrats favor. Indeed, Brennan acknowledges
as much: “if the United States were to start using a voter qualification exam right now, such as
an exam I got to design, I’d expect that the people who pass the exam would be disproportion-
ately white, upper-middle- to upper-class, educated, employed males,” owing to the “underlying
injustices and social problems that tend to make it so that some groups are more likely to be knowl-
edgeable than others” (2016, p. 228, original emphasis). It is all the more reasonable to suppose
that, in historical situations marked by even deeper social inequality than the present, the dis-
advantaged groups targeted by historically observed franchise restrictions would have performed
worse than the rest of the population on a hypothetical voter qualification exam. Under that as-
sumption, the above studies all provide evidence against the conjecture that the quality of political
decision-making is an increasing function of the proportion of the electorate that would pass a
voter qualification exam of the kind epistocrats favor.
We should not overstate the evidence. Only a small number of studies provide credible esti-
mates of the causal effects of franchise expansions or restrictions, and each study considers effects
on only a few policy outcomes. It is of course possible that franchise expansions had undesirable
effects on other policy outcomes, not considered in any of the studies. This observation raises a
concern about publication bias, too. Would studies that failed to find effects of franchise exten-
sions on these variables have had the same chances of being published? How many outcomes have
scholars considered only to come up empty-handed and to relegate their null result to the proverbial
file drawer? These are good reasons for caution in drawing strong conclusions from the existing
10
literature. But the evidence we have, whatever its limits, suggests that the strong epistocracy con-
jecture fails to hold generally. Put differently, the evidence shows that there are conditions under
which the quality of political decision-making improves despite a decrease in the proportion of the
electorate possessing the forms of competence tested by a voter qualification exam.
Epistocrats may object that historically observed suffrage restrictions were crude means of
increasing the average competence of electorates. In the case of women’s suffrage, for example,
the gender restriction excluded women who would have passed a qualification exam and included
men who would have failed it. Thus, the studies we cite above provide no evidence against the
epistemic benefits of imposing a well-designed voter qualification exam, such that all and only
those members of the population who pass the exam are eligible to vote.
To clarify the objection and our answer, let N designate the set of all citizens, with E,E ′ ⊆ N
designating subsets of the citizen population. Let U ⊆ N be the subset of citizens enfranchised
under universal suffrage, and let C ⊂ N be the set of all “competent citizens,” those possessing
the form of competence that an epistocrat’s favored qualification exam would measure. For any
subset E ⊆ N, let v(E) be the expected quality of political decisions when the electorate is E,
and let pi(E) designate the proportion of E who are competent citizens. By definition, pi(C) = 1;
we assume that pi(U) < 1, that is, at least some people enfranchised under a democratic regime
of universal suffrage would fail the epistocrat’s qualification exam. We can now distinguish two
versions of the epistocrat’s conjecture. In addition to the strong version stated above, a weaker
version is suggested by the anticipated objection to our argument:
Strong conjecture: for any E,E ′ ⊆ N, if pi(E)> pi(E ′), then v(E)> v(E ′).
Weak conjecture: v(C)> v(U).
Under the plausible assumption that pi(U)< 1, the strong conjecture implies the weak conjecture
but the converse is false. Where the strong conjecture generalizes over all pairwise comparisons
of hypothetical electorates, ranking them according to their proportions of competent citizens,
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the weak conjecture merely advances a claim about one pair of possible electorates, ranking the
electorate comprising all and only competent citizens against the universal suffrage electorate.
Each of the studies surveyed above spoke to a pairwise comparison of a restricted and expanded
electorate, but in none of the studies was the comparison between C and U , the two possible
electorates that the epistocrat is most concerned to rank. The epistocrat may thus accept that the
historical evidence conflicts with the strong conjecture yet maintain the plausibility of the weak
conjecture. Since epistocrats’ institutional proposal is just to substitute C for U , they are only
committed to defending the weak conjecture, not the strong one.
In reply, it is hard to think of any reasons for accepting the weak conjecture that are compatible
with the most plausible explanations for the evidence against the strong conjecture. To demon-
strate this point, we now turn our attention to several causal mechanisms that offer compelling
explanations of the findings from the surveyed studies — that is, mechanisms that can explain why
decreasing the proportion of the electorate who would pass a qualification exam can nonetheless
improve the quality of decision-making in certain cases. We then show that these mechanisms give
us good reasons to question the weak conjecture.
Epistocrats: Beware of indirect effects
Preliminary distinctions
Say that a decision procedure is reliable if, for some policy domain, it tends to support a policy
when the balance of relevant reasons weighs in its favor and it tends to oppose a policy when
the balance of relevant reasons weighs against it. To be reliable, a decision procedure must duly
account for the reasons that bear on policy choices in a domain and accord these reasons proper
weight. Say that knowledge of a certain sort (e.g., knowledge of economics) or a certain cognitive
skill used to acquire such knowledge (e.g., a skill at abstract reasoning) is a relevant competency if
its mobilization by a decision procedure contributes to the latter’s reliability.
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Epistocrats tend to emphasize certain kinds of cognitive competencies — knowledge and skills
that are acquired through study and scholarly (especially social scientific) inquiry. It is hard to dis-
pute that these are relevant competencies. But, as epistemic democrats are quick to point out (e.g.,
Anderson, 2010; Landemore, 2012), epistocrats’ favored competencies are not the only relevant
ones. Some competencies that are typically acquired from life experiences rather than study also
contribute to a decision procedure’s reliability. To illustrate with an example, suppose a society
is considering policies that would specify the conditions under which police officers can stop and
interrogate a person for suspicious activity. To be reliable, the decision procedure must account
for the full range of reasons for and against the candidate policies and accord them proper weight.
Among the reasons against the stop-and-frisk policy are the various costs it imposes on the citizens
whom the police confront. Given the limited powers of the human imagination, it may be that
someone with first-hand experiences of being in this situation will more reliably appreciate those
burdens and accord them the weight they are due. If so, then such experiences are an example of a
relevant competency — a knowledge that, when mobilized, contributes to the reliability of policy
choices in this domain.
Additionally, while the knowledge and reasoning skills emphasized by epistocrats may be nec-
essary for reliable decisions, they are hardly sufficient. Concern for others’ well-being is not
typically thought of as a competency, yet its mobilization contributes to reliable decisions, at least
in certain policy domains. A person who is knowledgeable about economics and has advanced
reasoning skills yet cares too little about others’ well-being is not disposed to treat the fact that a
policy harms others as a reason to oppose it, or is not disposed to give that consideration the weight
it deserves. A reliable decision procedure requires not only mobilizing knowledge about which
facts count as reasons for and against policies, but also dispositions to respond to those reasons
appropriately, to give them proper weight. We thus count dispositions to respond appropriately to
reasons as relevant competencies.
With these distinctions in place, we now turn to two types of mechanism that could explain why
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some historically observed suffrage expansions have had beneficial effects on policy despite plau-
sibly reducing the proportion of the electorate that would have passed an epistocrat’s hypothetical
voter qualification exam.
The selection effect
In the above cases of suffrage expansion, the newly enfranchised voters arguably were more likely
to have certain relevant competencies (including certain dispositions) that made them more likely
to recognize and respond appropriately to the reasons weighing in favor of the beneficial policy
changes that came in the wake of their enfranchisement. For example, Miller’s own explanation
for her findings is that women were more concerned with children’s welfare than men, so their
enfranchisement implied that a greater proportion of the electorate demonstrated heightened con-
cern for children’s welfare (2008, pp. 1287–88, 1293–95, 1302f). Politicians duly responded to the
shift in their electorates’ preferences following women’s enfranchisement. Plausibly, women were
also more likely to have knowledge, through first-hand experience of bearing and raising children,
of some of the reasons weighing in favor of the public health policies that politicians adopted fol-
lowing suffrage expansion. That is, their experiences as mothers gave them knowledge of relevant
facts and their greater concern for children’s welfare made them more disposed to respond appro-
priately to those facts. Such competencies were more important for reliably deciding among public
health measures than knowledge of political trivia or of concepts like demand elasticity.
Kroth et al.’s explanation for the effects of black enfranchisement on electrification is that “vot-
ers desire for themselves and their community to have access to electricity” (2016, pp. 776) — and,
they implicitly assume, voters are more concerned about their own communities’ access than they
are about others’. Thus, white voters were less likely than the newly enfranchised black voters to
respond appropriately to the fact that expanding the electrical grid to give access to predominantly
black communities would benefit those communities. That fact was a reason for expansion, and
while white voters could have come to recognize that obvious fact, self-interested motives made
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black voters more likely to respond appropriately to it than white voters. Similar mechanisms plau-
sibly explain the effects of blacks’ disenfranchisement in the American South after Reconstruction
and the effects of their subsequent enfranchisement after the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as well as the
effects of enfranchising Sweden’s non-citizen population on funding for family and social services.
These are examples of a selection effect of franchise expansions: the franchise expansion se-
lects for inclusion a group of individuals who represent a broader range of relevant competencies.10
Put the other way around, franchise restrictions select for inclusion a group of individuals who rep-
resent a narrow range of relevant competencies and thus fails to mobilize a range of competencies
that can improve the quality of policy decisions. Specifically, newly enfranchised (obversely, ex-
cluded) citizens bring with them experiences (e.g., as children’s primary caregivers) that make
them more likely to recognize certain problems that could be addressed with changes in policy.
Additionally, they are especially disposed to recognize and give weight to reasons that are typi-
cally neglected by members of a restricted electorate. Even if white politicians and voters knew
that African-American children would benefit from increased teacher-pupil ratios in their schools,
or that black South Africans would benefit from improved access to electricity, they typically failed
to give these facts proper weight in their policy choices.
A crucial feature of the mechanism underlying this selection effect is that disparate specific
forms of knowledge, skills, and motivational dispositions are negatively correlated with each other
within a population. As a result, citizens who would pass an epistocratic voter competence exam
will tend to lack certain relevant competencies. Around the turn of the 20th century, for exam-
ple, men were more likely to have the competencies that a voter qualification exam would have
assessed, but women were more likely to have experiences and dispositions that made them able to
10This clearly resonates with epistemic democrats’ emphasis on mobilizing various forms of
“epistemic diversity” in a population (e.g., Anderson 2006, 2010; Landemore 2012; cf. Hong and
Page, 2004).
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recognize and respond appropriately to the reasons justifying a more aggressive public health ini-
tiative. At the end of apartheid, white South Africans were more likely to have the competencies
that a voter qualification exam would test for, but less likely to respond appropriately to certain
kinds of reasons, namely considerations of how policies such as expanded electrification would
benefit black South Africans. Thus, although the observed voting restrictions had the effect of
selecting for one kind of competency, in doing so they also selected against other competencies
that contribute to reliable decision making.
The selection effect sketched here plausibly explains the empirical evidence surveyed in the
previous section, evidence that undermines the strong epistocracy conjecture. Yet notice that the
selection effect also gives us a strong reason to question the weak conjecture. The weak conjecture
is plausible only if one can reasonably dismiss the possibility of negative correlations between
the competencies measured by an epistocratic voter qualification exam and other competencies
that contribute to reliable decision making. But there are no general reasons for dismissing this
possibility, as reflection on the preceding examples makes plain.
On the contrary, there are general reasons for expecting these negative correlations. Consider
why some but not all citizens possess the competencies measured by a voter qualification exam.
Their possession is not a random accident. If one has the competencies measured by the exam,
it is due to some mix of personality traits, education and upbringing, and the social and political
environments one inhabits. As Brennan puts it, “educated people expect other educated people to
keep up with politics,” while “some people acquire knowledge just because they find it interesting”
(2016, p. 36). One would expect the same features of personality, educational attainment, and so-
cial milieu that cause some people to find it rewarding to acquire these competencies — either for
their own sake or as means of acquiring social prestige — to have other important effects, such as
effects on occupation or income.11 Thus, with respect to both the antecedent causes of the mea-
sured competencies and their other downstream effects, the people who pass a voter qualification
11Christiano (2008) makes a similar point while discussing Mill’s plural voting scheme (pp. 120,
16
exam are likely to differ systematically from those who do not.
Owing to these systematic differences, citizens who would pass a voter qualification exam can
be reasonably expected to differ from those who would fail the exam with respect to their propen-
sities to recognize and give adequate weight to certain kinds of reasons bearing on policies that
tend to affect the two groups differently. For example, someone who is or has been unemployed is,
all else equal, more likely to be aware of and give adequate weight to important reasons in favor of
government-provided unemployment insurance than someone who has never been unemployed. In
general, those who benefit from (or shoulder the burdens of) a policy are more likely to be aware
of its benefits (burdens) and to be disposed to treat those benefits (burdens) as reasons to support
(oppose) the policy. In addition to the effect of self-interest, sympathetic identification with other
members of a group who benefit from the policy may have comparable effects. Some mechanism
along these lines presumably explains why, according to one analysis of recent survey data, 74
percent of the unemployed, but only 46 percent of those working full-time, agreed that the govern-
ment has a responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (Weeden and
Kurzban 2017, p. 74). The eligible voters under an epistocracy are less likely to experience unem-
ployment; thus, they will be less likely to recognize the reasons for unemployment insurance and
less likely to give them adequate weight in their deliberations. The logic of this example plausibly
extends more widely.
An epistocrat might take us to be pressing what David Estlund (2008) calls the “demographic
objection” to epistocracy. Brennan states the objection as follows:
Under any realistic epistocratic system, people who belong to certain already-
advantaged groups are likely to acquire more power than people who belong to certain
disadvantaged groups [because people who are already advantaged are much better
informed than the disadvantaged]. An epistocracy is thus likely to have unfair policies
121).
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that serve the interests of the advantaged rather than those of the disadvantaged.
Brennan replies that
it seems, for starters, to presuppose that voters will each vote for their self-interest or
for those of whatever group they belong to. But as already discussed. . . , that’s false.
Most voters vote for what they perceive to be the national common good. (Brennan
2016, p. 227)
But our challenge is not the the one Brennan considers, and his reply fails to answer our challenge.
We are not claiming that voters invariably vote for whatever policies promote their own interests
or the interests of the groups they identify with. Our claim is instead that the competencies that a
qualification exam selects for will negatively correlate with other relevant competencies, such that
the citizens who would pass the exam would be less likely to recognize and respond appropriately
to certain kinds of considerations.12 As a consequence, including only citizens who would pass the
exam will lead to unreliable decision-making in some policy domains, especially those domains
in which their limited perspectives would lead them to neglect numerous important reasons for
or against specific policies. The influence of self-interest on one’s attitudes is one factor — think
12Our claim is similar to a version of what Estlund calls the “demographic objection” to Mill’s
plural voting scheme (Estlund 2008, pp. 215–219). The most far-reaching version of the objection
Estlund considers is that there may be unobserved variables that are both “epistemically distorting”
and correlate with qualities like education or literacy (p. 217, 218). He does not endorse the
objection, but considers it not unreasonable (it is, in his terminology, a “qualified objection” to
plural voting). We are making the stronger claim that it would in fact be quite improbable if the
narrow range of competencies measured by a voter qualification exam did not correlate negatively
with at least some other competencies whose presence within the electorate affects a decision
procedure’s reliability. The competencies that such an exam measures are not assigned at random
to people, as we stressed above.
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of Kroth et al.’s explanation for the effects of black enfranchisement on electrification. But it is
not the only factor — think of Miller’s explanation for the effects of women’s enfranchisement on
child mortality. Even if we conceded, for the sake of argument, that self-interest has a negligible
influence on political attitudes, our selection effect would still provide a strong reason to question
the epistocracy conjecture in both its weak and strong forms.
The treatment effect
We briefly consider two other mechanisms that could plausibly explain the observed effects of
suffrage expansions surveyed above. In contrast with the selection effect, the mechanisms we
now consider involve a treatment effect: expanding suffrage beyond those who would pass a voter
qualification exam causes those who would pass the exam to acquire additional competencies along
relevant dimensions. Put the other way around: restricting suffrage to those who would pass a voter
qualification exam causes eligible voters to have a narrower range of competencies than they would
have under universal suffrage.
One’s ability to recognize and respond appropriately to reasons for or against public policy
options is, in part, an endogenous outcome of one’s social and political environment and the incen-
tives it creates. One reason is that in any electoral regime, the information that is readily available
to citizens depends in part on the content of electoral campaigns and the issues they emphasize,
which in turn reflects the incentives of political parties to win the votes of whomever has the right
to vote. Change the electorate and one will change the information available to citizens and thereby
the competencies that voters will acquire. Recall Miller’s (2008) finding that women’s suffrage in-
creased public health spending as politicians responded to women’s comparatively greater concern
for public health issues. It is plausible to suppose that men were more likely to become aware of
those issues after the suffrage expansion made infant mortality a salient topic for electoral cam-
paigns. If so, then excluding women from the electorate not only selected for voters who would
be, irrespective of the suffrage rules, less aware of the reasons in favor of increased spending on
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public health, but it also caused the (male) voters to be less aware than they would have been had
women been enfranchised. Call this treatment effect of a franchise restriction the informational
effect.
There is some reason to expect that suffrage rules have a second kind of treatment effect. To
account for evidence that white jurors on racially integrated juries “raise a wider range of issues,
take greater care to make accurate statements, and correct efforts more often than whites in all-
white juries,” Anderson (2010) proposes an “accountability hypothesis”:
the presence of racially diverse members in a working group of equals widens the
range of people to whom each participant must justify their opinions and conduct
and so motivates the participants to think more carefully about what they say and
do from what they anticipate are the perspectives of racial out-group members. This
inspires participants to be more thoughtful, to consider a wider range of information, to
take more seriously concerns that would be dismissed in a more homogeneous group.
(Anderson, 2010, pp. 130, original emphasis)
We can easily imagine a comparable mechanism at work under universal suffrage. In addition
to increasing their awareness of certain considerations, removing franchise restrictions may also
cause members of a restricted electorate to be more likely to care and give these previously ne-
glected considerations the weight they deserve, lest they be seen as morally deficient in the eyes
of citizens they now feel themselves partly accountable to. Call this treatment effect of a franchise
restriction the motivational effect.
Our claim that both effects will operate is admittedly speculative. It is hard to conduct quasi-
experimental studies of the effects of franchise restrictions on voters’ information and motivations.
Evidence for the two treatment effects in non-electoral domains (e.g., juries) is relevant but not
dispositive. Despite these caveats, the hypothesized treatment effects are plausible enough for our
purposes. Recall the larger structure of the argument. The empirical evidence surveyed from his-
torically observed franchise restrictions conflicts with the strong epistocracy conjecture, leading us
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to ask whether one could identify a plausible causal mechanism that would explain the empirical
evidence without also providing reasons to reject the weak epistocracy conjecture. We have identi-
fied three plausible mechanisms to account for the evidence, and each provides reasons to challenge
the weak conjecture. A perfect voter qualification exam — one that grants voting rights to all and
only those who possess epistocrat’s favored cognitive competencies — would still fail to mobilize
certain relevant competencies, by selecting against their inclusion or by creating an environment
in which voters would predictably fail to acquire a broad range of relevant competencies.13
Here is another way to state our argument. Epistocrats limit their attention to a partial effect of
restricting the suffrage to citizens who would pass a voter qualification exam. Specifically, epis-
tocrats highlight a direct effect of such restrictions, namely the epistemic benefits of increasing
the proportion of the electorate who are well-informed about relevant social scientific facts and
are disposed to reason well about these facts. But if one believes that any one of our proposed
mechanisms operates, then a full accounting of the epistemic consequences of suffrage restrictions
must also consider their indirect effects — specifically, the epistemic costs of excluding a diverse
range of relevant competencies. A compelling epistemic argument for restricting the suffrage to
citizens with a narrow range of cognitive competencies depends on the total effect of such restric-
tions, which is some function of the relative magnitudes of the direct and indirect effects. Since we
have provided evidence of cases where the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect, arguments for
franchise restrictions that merely focus on the direct effect — as epistocrats’ arguments do — are
13One could express skepticism about all three mechanisms. But if one wishes to maintain the
weak epistocracy conjecture, one still must account for the empirical evidence surveyed above with
some other mechanism that does not pose a challenge for the weak conjecture. This is necessarily
a speculative enterprise. We should discipline it as far as possible with available evidence, but it is
no devastating objection to our overall argument to point out the speculative nature of our claims
about the mechanisms accounting for the historical evidence.
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unpersuasive.
Epistemic democrats too: Beware of indirect effects
The conclusion of the previous section might seem to bolster the epistemic democrat’s position.
Indeed, epistemic arguments for universal suffrage rely on mechanisms that, if not identical to the
ones we present above, bear a strong resemblance to them (esp. Anderson 2006, 2010; Landemore
2012). But it would be too quick to use our argument to conclude in favor of universal suffrage.
These mechanisms explain why a competence-based franchise restriction could have negative
partial effects on the reliability of a decision procedure. Disenfranchising people who fail a com-
petence exam produces an electorate whose average member is less responsive to certain kinds
of reasons that bear on the choice of good policy; all else being equal, that reduces the overall
reliability of the decision-making procedure. But all else is not equal. Another partial effect of
imposing the exam is that the average voter is now more likely to have the kind of basic knowledge
and reasoning abilities that the exam measures; all else being equal, that improves the overall relia-
bility of the decision-making procedure. In positing mechanisms that explain the first set of partial
effects, we have not denied that competence-based restrictions would also have the latter partial
effect. Our criticism of epistemic arguments for competence-based franchise restrictions was just
that epistocrats have focused myopically on one partial effect of such restrictions, neglecting the
possibility that the restrictions would also have other indirect costs, and thus neglecting the crucial
comparison of epistemic costs and benefits. But it would also be a mistake to focus exclusively on
the epistemic costs of franchise restrictions, neglecting their potential benefits and the comparison
of the two.
In fact, epistemic democrats face a challenge that is analogous to the one confronting episto-
crats. Let us first make explicit a feature of the mechanisms we have discussed: the epistemic
costs associated with competence-based restrictions arise from their effects on the proportion of
the electorate who have a certain disposition, life experience, or form of knowledge, not from
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their effects on the absolute number of such voters. For example, the relevant effect of excluding
women was not that one had zero women voters instead of 30 million women voters, but rather that
zero percent of voters were women, instead of fifty percent of voters. In this respect, the mecha-
nisms considered earlier differ from that associated with the well-known Condorcet jury theorem,
in which absolute numbers matter. We flag that difference here because it means that, given our
proposed mechanisms, excluding citizens from the electorate is epistemically costly only if doing
so affects the proportions of different types of citizens within the electorate. The mere fact that the
electorate is not as large as it could be is neither here nor there, as far as these mechanisms go.14
Next, recall the form of the arguments that appealed to those mechanisms. If one starts with
universal suffrage and then institutes a qualification exam, one increases the proportion of voters
who possess one valuable form of competence, while decreasing the proportions of voters pos-
14See Goodin and Spiekermann (2018) for a recent sophisticated discussion of the Condorcet
jury theorem and its refinements. As they note, in the classical framework of the theorem, large
electorates will produce the right decision with near certainty, whether they comprise the entire
population or some restricted subset thereof, so long as the average member of the electorate is
more reliable than a coin flip and the other assumptions of the theorem hold (p. 236). Thus,
the classical jury theorem does not explain why there might be non-negligible differences in the
epistemic reliability of rival electoral regimes, all of whose electorates are sufficiently large, in
absolute terms. What Goodin and Spiekermann call the “best responder corollary” might provide
such an explanation (Dietrich and List, 2004; Dietrich and Spiekermann, 2013a, 2013b; Goodin
and Spiekermann, 2018, sec. 5.3). But it could just as well yield an argument for restricting the
suffrage. As they say, within that framework, it is “very much an open question whether a small
group of experts or the whole electorate is more likely to perform better, epistemically” (p. 238),
and the same goes for a comparison of universal suffrage with a competence-based restriction. See
their sec. 15.5.3 and especially footnote 34 on p. 239.
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sessing other valuable forms of competence, provided that the different forms of competence are
negatively correlated. There is no reason to believe that, in general, the epistemic benefit from
boosting the prevalence of one type of competence outweighs the cost of reducing the prevalence
of the others. But an equivalent way to express that observation is to say that if one starts with an
electoral epistocracy and then abolishes the voter qualification exam, then one decreases the pro-
portion of voters who possess one valuable form of competence, while increasing the proportions
of voters possessing other valuable forms of competence, provided they are negatively correlated.
Again, there is no reason to believe that, in general, the epistemic benefit of increasing these other
forms of competence outweighs the epistemic cost of reducing the prevalence of the kind that is
measured by the voter qualification exam.15
Indeed, it seems improbable that, as a general rule, universal suffrage would strike the optimal
balance between the tradeoffs we are exposing here. An institutional designer concerned to maxi-
mize the epistemic reliability of an electorate would try to assemble an electorate with the optimal
distribution of the relevant competencies, taking into account the complex mechanisms through
which the incorporation of more or less voters of a certain type could influence political decisions.
Universal suffrage is an extreme solution to this problem, and it is not obvious why circumstances
would conspire to make it the optimal solution. To elicit some intuitions, consider an analogy.
Imagine that one is trying to assemble a panel of scientists who will advise a decision-maker. The
problems that the decision-maker will encounter are unknown, but one knows that knowledge of
various disciplines will be useful — physics, chemistry, biology, computer science, statistics, and
so on. The optimal composition of the panel is unlikely to be a statistically representative sample of
the population of scientists in these disciplines. If biologists make up a majority of the population,
owing to the vagaries of universities’ hiring practices and the availability of funding for biological
research, that is no reason to think that biologists will make up a majority of the optimal panel of
15Cf. MacGilvray (2014).
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advisers. Analogously, if people with first-hand knowledge of poverty make up only ten percent
of the adult population, that is no reason to think that, in the epistemically optimal electorate, only
ten percent of voters would be drawn from this segment of the population. More generally, the
fact that the adult population, which would be enfranchised under universal suffrage, has a certain
distribution of types is itself no reason to think that the optimal electorate would have the same
distribution of types.
To this observation, the epistemic democrat might reasonably reply that their ambition is not
to show that universal suffrage is the maximally reliable electorate among all possible electorates,
but only that it is more reliable than some restricted class of alternatives, including those that result
from imposing epistocratic suffrage restrictions. But the reasons for skepticism given above ar-
guably apply to those comparisons too. Consider again the analogy with the scientific panel. Why
think that a representative sample from the population of scientists would provide more reliably
sound advice to the decision-maker than a panel selected in a two-step process, in which one first
draws a random sample of scientists and then excludes those who fail an exam testing basic knowl-
edge of, say, statistics?16 The representative sample could be better, owing to the kinds of negative
correlations between different types of competence that we have discussed. But it need not be.
Which panel is better depends on a complicated mix of contingent factors, like the kinds of prob-
lems the panel is likely to confront, the distribution of the different types of scientists within the
general population, and, in particular, the patterns of correlation between the knowledge measured
by the qualification exam and other kinds of competence.
16Given the value placed on diversity in some epistemic arguments for democracy (esp. Lande-
more, 2012), it is worth noting that universal suffrage does not in general maximize diversity of
the relevant types of voters. For example, if one ethnic group makes up a large majority of the
population, then universal suffrage will produce a less ethnically diverse electorate than a suffrage
rule that disenfranchises some portion of the ethnic majority.
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How could epistemic democrats respond at the point? Notice that denying the postulated nega-
tive correlation between types of competence does not strengthen the epistemic case for universal
suffrage — on the contrary, it only strengthens the case for epistocracy. Imagine, as the limiting
case, that a voter qualification exam perfectly measures a narrowly defined form of cognitive com-
petence that influences political judgments and attitudes but no other attributes of a person, and that
the measured form of competence is as good as randomly assigned within the adult population. In
this case, the citizens who would pass the voter qualification exam are like a random sample of the
adult population but for their superior competence (as measured by the exam) and their political
judgments, which show the effects of their superior competence. The citizens enfranchised under
the epistocrat’s proposal would then be just as diverse as the general adult population with respect
to any attributes not measured by the competence exam, and none of the mechanisms discussed
earlier could explain why there would be epistemic costs associated with disenfranchising those
who fail the exam.17 The postulated negative correlation is thus not what underwrites the skep-
ticism about universal suffrage. This negative correlation is what explains why the total effect of
instituting the epistocrat’s favored suffrage restriction is ambiguous in theory, rather than being
unambiguously positive. The epistemic democrat needs to explain why the total effect of such a
restriction is unambiguously negative. Denying the negative correlation among different forms of
competence does not serve that goal.
17In this hypothetical scenario, the competence-based franchise restriction would produce an
electorate that is similar to the electorate in Lo´pez-Guerra’s (2014) model, where, prior to each
election, citizens are first randomly selected to participate in a competence-building exercise, and
only these citizens are allowed to vote in the election. In the latter case, institutions randomly
assign competence to a subset of the population, and then enfranchise them and only them; in
our hypothetical scenario in the text, “nature” randomly assigns competence to a subset of the
population, and then institutions enfranchise them and only them.
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Might the epistemic democrat conjecture that, in the case of those citizens who would fail the
competence exam, the epistemic contributions of their life experiences and moral dispositions al-
ways outweigh the effects of their cognitive shortcomings? We submit that this claim is not credible
as a general rule. For example, if we are deciding whether to make certain vaccinations compul-
sory, why think that the good intentions of anti-vaxxers would dominate the (negative) effects of
their scientific ignorance on decision-making reliability? Even if one finds this conjecture prima
facie plausible, the important point is that it remains a conjecture for which epistemic democrats
have provided neither empirical evidence or strong theoretical arguments, so far as we can see.
Conclusion
We have made two points about epistemic arguments for competence-based franchise restrictions.
First, epistocrats must reckon with the evidence that, at least in some cases, historical franchise
restrictions decreased the reliability of decision-making. That evidence is relevant, even if it does
not speak directly to the assumptions of epistocrats’ arguments, because the most plausible expla-
nations for the historical evidence posit mechanisms that could also be expected to operate if the
franchise were restricted on the basis of a competence test. Restricting the franchise to citizens
who pass the test could be expected to produce an electorate in which certain competencies, not
measured by the test, are underrepresented due to the selection effects of such a test — the abilities
and knowledge that such a test would measure are not assigned at random, but are rather the prod-
uct of hard-to-measure underlying traits and circumstances that in turn affect political opinions.
And the competence-based restriction could also be expected to influence the information and dis-
positions of the “competent” citizens enfranchised by such a test, due to its treatment effects on
political attitudes — the composition of the electorate affects the incentives of political parties to
campaign on certain issues rather than others (the informational effect), and plausibly affects the
peers to whom these competent citizens will feel accountable when adopting and defending their
political positions (the motivational effect). Analogous mechanisms plausibly explain the effects of
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historical franchise restrictions, and one could reasonably expect them to operate in an epistocracy
too.
Our second point, building on the first, is that an epistemic argument for or against a
competence-based franchise restriction would have to take into account the effects that operate
through these mechanisms, and compare them with the direct effects of the restriction, operating
through the reduction in the proportion of voters lacking basic factual knowledge or relevant cog-
nitive skills. A persuasive epistemic argument must aim at a conclusion about the total effect of
such a restriction, which reflects the relative magnitudes of these different partial effects on the
reliability of the decision-making process. To date, epistocrats and epistemic democrats alike have
merely emphasized their favorite partial effects without advancing any arguments that speak to the
relevant comparison.
Any argument that would speak to a comparison of these disparate partial effects would have
to be largely empirical,18 and they would likely have to rely on controversial political judg-
ments — neither of which describes existing epistemic arguments for or against democracy. They
would have to be more empirically oriented because the total effect of any proposed deviation from
universal suffrage depends on contingent circumstances, in particular the statistical associations
between various forms of competence within the population of citizens. There is no theoretical
basis for making general predictions about those associations. And they would likely rely on con-
troversial political judgments because what counts as empirical evidence that suffrage restrictions
lead to better or worse decision-making depends on judgments about which decisions are better or
worse (Ingham, 2013). If one supports universal suffrage — or, for that matter, epistocracy — in
advance of such evidence and independently of judgments about which decisions are the right
18Our argument thus substantiates Schwartzberg’s (2015) assessment that a next step for work
on epistemic democracy is “[empirically] testing the conditions under which groups of ordinary
citizens are most likely to produce wise decisions” (p. 197).
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ones, then one should concede that one’s support is either unjustified or justified by non-epistemic
considerations.
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